Case studies in violence

(This post is an extract from my book: Half an Island: The Story of Timor L’Este)

Rape

 The litany of atrocities in the previous chapter is only partial. Consider some specific ‘case studies’. The first two are letters addressed to the UN Commission on Human Rights 54^th Session (March 1998). A young East Timorese, Domingas Maria Moniz sent the first.

I was born in a village called Kamanasa, in Suai, East Timor on 14 November 1972. I left East Timor in August 1997 because my life was in danger and because I was being repeatedly raped by members of the Indonesian military, who have illegally occupied East Timor since 1975. My entire family except for me, continue to live in Suai. I am indigenous Timorese.

In Suai, when we were able to go to Church, the Indonesian soldiers would also come to the Church and throw stones at the Church whenever we were trying to pray or sing hymns. Often, young girls were taken from inside the church by Indonesian soldiers who would take the girls back to their houses and rape them. This has happened to me many times. The soldiers started following me when I was about fifteen or sixteen years old. When I was about twenty years old I was abducted from the Church for the first time and taken back to the soldier's house and raped. This has happened to me so many times I cannot remember. Many different soldiers were involved. It was still happening to me only a couple of months before I left East Timor. This is the main reason why I had to escape from East Timor.

At the Convent on 23^rd April 1995, I was working voluntarily for the Church. I was giving medicine to one of the East Timorese guerrillas who I had been looking after for some time. The Indonesian soldiers found out that he had been at the Convent. They found out it was me who had helped him. The soldiers caught me at the Convent and then went to my family's house and rounded them all up. My whole family was taken to the Indonesian military station. We were all held for two days. My parents were beaten and we young girls were all raped. Two of my younger brothers were put inside small tanks of water and their heads dunked in until they were nearly drowned. The three of us girls were taken to other rooms and raped. They burnt my parents with cigarettes and used the leg of the chair to crush their feet. To one of my youngest brothers they tried to pull his finger and toe nails out. He lost consciousness and we thought that he was dead. The soldiers put him into a coffin and threw him in the bush. Young boys, who were collecting wood, saw the coffin was moving and they brought my brother back to us. My brother left Suai and went into hiding.

I was constantly having to move around from house to house in my village. Whenever soldiers came to search houses they were looking for East Timorese guerrillas and ammunition.  However, one of the main reasons they also searched houses for was to rape the women. I had to move from house to house and always be avoiding the soldiers for years on end. I could never sleep soundly. Being a young woman means that you have to do this in East Timor.

I will never go back to East Timor. I would be killed. I have already endured years of abuse. I mourn for my sisters as they are going through what I had to go through for years. They all want to escape but they do not have the money. I wish that I could help them[1].

Torture

Nelson de Jesus Guterres Amaral, 25 years old left East Timor in January 1998 because he was being persecuted by the Indonesian armed forces in East Timor. His story follows.

I was arrested with two companions on 21 August 1996, when I was trying to send some food, paper and pencils to members of the armed resistance engaged in fighting the occupiers.  The men who arrested us were soldiers in civilian clothing from Indonesia's 410 Battalion.  First they beat us up, and then took us to their barracks in Buicarin.

Fortunately, Buicarin locals saw us being taken in and informed a Catholic priest.  He alerted the International Red Cross in Dili.  That is what saved our lives.

At the Buicarin barracks, they interrogated us about collaboration between the local people and the guerrillas.  They wanted to know who was supplying them with food.  They also asked us about the guerrilla movement itself.  We were beaten and punched during the interrogations, which would go on for about three hours at a time. 

From there, they took us to the barracks of the 744 and 745 Battalions in Viqueque.  A captain asked me similar questions to before, and about any links between the local priest in Viqueque and the guerrillas.  The captain's interrogation lasted for about an hour, during which time he hit and punched me.  When he finished, he left me with five soldiers.  They ordered me to take all my clothes off and then tied me to a chair.  They brought in a battery and some wires and blindfolded me.  Then they began to torture me.  They broke one of my teeth when they hit me with the butt of a gun.  They gave me electric shocks in my head, armpits and genitals.  They burned me with cigarettes (I have three scars on my arm and chest).  They wounded me with a stick close to my eye and cut me with razor blades (I have the scars on my hand and neck).  The torture went on for about five hours.

 At about six in the morning, I heard one of the military say that a telegram had arrived from Captain Erik in Baucau, giving instructions that I should not be ill-treated because the International Red Cross had asked for permission to see me.  Although the ICRC's request was turned down, the torture stopped immediately.  They told me to go and wash my face.  Captain Erik, an Indonesian Catholic, came from Baucau to see me.  He took photographs of me and asked questions, again about the local people and the guerrilla movement.  He advised me to tell them everything I knew and not to be afraid.  Then he left.  Later I learned that the Red Cross visited my parents and took note of their identities as a way of protecting them from reprisals.  My parents were, in fact, questioned later, but they were not ill-treated.

I was held in the interrogation room in Viqueque for four days, and then taken to the barracks of the ‘Flamboyant’[2] special forces in Baucau.  I was questioned again there and held for five days in a tiny basement.  On 30 August, I was taken to Dili, and imprisoned for four months at the Senopati I, a military intelligence service.  I was interrogated mainly about the underground networks in Dili because they had found a message on me for someone living in Dili called Julião 'Mausiri'.  Questions also concentrated on Monsignor Belo.  They showed me a list of priests and told me to identify the ones working with the resistance.

I was released on Christmas Eve, with orders to go and find Julião 'Mausiri', and to pass information on to them about the priests.  I did not want to collaborate with them, so I had to hide.  I went underground for a year.  On 20 January 1998, I left Dili and made my way to Jakarta, where I took refuge in the Spanish Embassy.

I was lucky because the International Red Cross intervened in my case.  Unfortunately, the small Red Cross delegation in Dili simply does not have the resources to take any action in most other cases.

In conclusion Mr. President, I urge the Commission to take whatever steps it can to encourage government of Indonesia to allow free access to non-governmental human rights organizations.  A visit by the Special Rapporteur on Torture would also go a long way towards addressing the problem of torture in East Timor.  These steps, combined with the withdrawal of Indonesian armed forces, would significantly reduce human rights violations in my country[3].   

Abduction

In February 1998 in Rome, Bishop Belo referred to the fact that every month East Timorese children were taken away from their families in East Timor and handed over to families in Indonesia.  Bearing in mind that the High Commissioner for Human Rights had emphasized the need to prevent violations of human rights, he brought these violations, which were clearly cases of enforced or involuntary disappearances, to the attention of the Commission, in the hope that further disappearances could be prevented. Exactly what was happening?

For years, this had occurred. In some cases the authorities approached families offering to send their children away for education. This was an attractive option for many impoverished families. In other cases very young children were taken away mostly from extremely poor villagers and sent to other parts of Indonesia. In almost all cases the children were given to Muslim families or educated as Muslims. Some returned to proselytize in Catholic East Timor. Frictions were created when some that had acquiesced demanded that mosques be provided in villages. These requests were generally agreed to by the administration.

Tomás Alfredo Gândara was one of these victims. Born in 1979, in 1981 he was taken to Jakarta where he was handed over to a family of Indonesian public administration officials. For 15 years he was told he was Indonesian. Although he was baptized a Catholic, he was brought up as a Moslem. His sister was also taken to Jakarta and placed in the care of a social institution. He was never told anything about his true identity or that he had a sister in the same city.

In 1994, after years of searching, relatives found out where the two children were. His uncle traveled to Jakarta to seek them out and tell them about their true identities. Their parents were captured in 1979.  Their mother, Felicidade Lopes Gândara, a former medical student in Portugal, was 9 months pregnant.  On 11^th June 1979, just a week before her baby was due, soldiers of the 745 Battalion killed her in Los Palos.  She was stabbed by bayonets thrust into her abdomen.  Their ­father, who had been separated from his mother when they were arrested, was killed in Lore shortly after.

By the age of 17, Tomás knew little about East Timor. From time to time he would hear about his adopted friends or relatives being killed while serving in the Indonesian military in East Timor. He also learned that youngsters his own age had been killed in the Santa Cruz massacre in 1991, but little more than that. When he arrived in East Timor he was shocked by the poverty of the East Timorese, by the military presence which was vastly greater than what he had seen in Indonesia and especially by the terror that these soldiers instilled in the East Timorese population. Tomás went to the Commission on Human Rights outlining what was done to him as a child. He reported that the same was continuing in East Timor. Tragically, little international attention has been given to this issue.

One thing was certain, the endless human rights abuses - granted carried out by both parties in the conflict - demanded a response. That the international community trusted ABRI as the perpetrators of the majority of these atrocities to reduce the problem when in other countries direct international intervention has been undertaken defies logic. In 1999 enough evidence had been collected to provide prosecutors in any war crimes tribunals with material sufficient to bring those responsible to justice. That is for the future and must be done. Other issues such as nation building take priority, but justice in human rights terms demands that ABRI’s military commanders and the officers responsible for implementing such policies are brought to trial.

Arrest

Intelligence agents from SGI and the police arrested Constancio Pinto along with his friend Paulo George Rodrigues Pareira. They had just disembarked from the ship KM Tatamailau and were taken to the Police Security Guard Post at the port in Dili. Before being taken to the Dili Resort Police Station, both were searched at the Guard Post of Dili port. Inside their baggage were two AIWA tape recorders, three SONY short wave radios, one NOKIA cellular phone and one small box with ammunition and a pistol.  Inside a Blue Bag were four photo albums containing personal pictures from a visit to Germany and Portugal, books called ‘AST Political Manifesto’, ‘Socialism and Indonesian Development’, ‘Utopian Ideology Politics’, ‘The Tasks of Youth’, ‘Death in Dili‘, a large package containing letter from the Army Chief of Falintil at Cipinang prison, some cassettes and Rp. 250,000 in cash. As well, they carried newspaper clippings, a copy of the FALINTIL magazine, a cassette of recorded interviews with Ramos Horta, two boxes containing 20 bombs. Additional incidental items included 76 M-16 assault rifles and .45 caliber FN pistol bullets

Constancio and his colleagues had assembled the bombs in Semarang based on the Order of the Army Chief of Falintil, Xanana. This was in order to strengthen the resistance of the Falintil military front. After assembling the bomb, they were ordered by Xanana to carry the bomb to Dili, East Timor and to give it to the Falintil in the jungle to destroy the Indonesian Military forces in different stations in East Timor.

The bombs were not meant to be used to kill civilians, whether Indonesian or East Timorese. There was never any intention to kill civilians, or to sabotage the re-appointment of, nor to kill the East Timorese Governor, Abilio Osorio Soares, as the Indonesian government claimed.

They saw the goal of Falintil struggle, and its special force, Brigada Negara, as to defend East Timor, and to liberate the people of East Timor from the oppression of Indonesian military forces in East Timor. They denied they were terrorists, as the Indonesian government repeatedly stated. Indonesia has not been able to fool the international community by using that term. They had no basis to label the guerrilla forces as terrorists because East Timor was and is still considered as a War Zone.

On the 10^th January 1998, Constancio wrote the following about his subsequent interrogation and torture.

‘Today, when I tell my story openly in this room, I am sure that those police officials and SGI intelligence agents attending this trial will shout that I tell lies. ‘We, the East Timorese people, are always considered lying whenever we yell about the truth and justice.’ From September 15, 1997 at 9-10 AM to September 16, 1997 at 9:00 PM I was forced to confess to whom the letter from the Army Chief of Falintil Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão and the bomb I had carried should be given to. I replied I did not know because according to the order from the Army Chief of Falintil once I arrived in Dili, I had to contact the Secretary General of AST, Dr. Avelino alias Shalar Kossi in Semarang. But these police and the intelligence agents from SGI did not believe me.

Because I kept saying I did not know, my chest and my face were beaten up and I was told to kneel down. My hands were pulled to my back and shackled. The intelligence agents and the police officials sat behind me and burnt my shackled hands with cigarettes. They kicked my ribs and my stomach. When I fell down, a commander of the SGI intelligence agent, a Batak person, (I do not know his name), stepped on my body repeatedly. Then I was told to stand on one leg for about 2-3 hours while answering their questions. If I said I didn't know, they would start kicking and beating me. They threatened to take me to the SGI Post to be given electric shocks. To avoid further torture and threats, I finally just followed the language of these SGI intelligence agents and the police.’

Becora prison, January 10, 1998

During his trial on Wednesday 21^st January 1998, Constancio (alias Aquita) tore apart the District Attorney's paper. The incident in the courtroom of Dili State Court rather surprised Judge I Made Nandu and District Attorney Eko Purwanto as well as an appreciative courtroom audience. He unfurled a banner and shouted pro independence slogans. ‘We will not stop fighting,’ he yelled loudly. ‘We are not terrorists who attempt to kill people arbitrarily. We only fight for the independence of East Timor!’ Security officers grabbed the banner and forced Constancio to leave the Courtroom. Outside the room accompanied by his lawyer, but Constancio screamed out his slogans as he was hustled away. Throughout the trial, Constancio maintained his line that the bombs were made under the instruction of his military Commander. Both were eventually jailed, but released shortly after when it was discovered that Australians in Java had helped them.

Imprisonment

Becora prison is located in the eastern suburbs of Dili and has approximately 257[4] inmates, some of whom are political prisoners.  The ETHRC reported in February 1997 that grave violations of human rights had been allegedly perpetrated against East Timorese prisoners between September 1995 and February 1996. Many of the alleged violations were detailed in a letter of protest written by East Timorese prisoners in Becora to the Minister for Justice of Indonesia.[5]

The reports included details of three riots which took place at the prison during that period and information about prisoners who were tortured, including the names of the perpetrators, members of the prison staff. The reports documented cases of religious discrimination and intolerance. Violations of this type were not only in breach of Indonesian law but also in breach of accepted international standards for treatment of prisoners, including international standards to which Indonesia subscribes.

The Indonesian Ministry of Justice states that the aim of the correctional system ‘is not to be a system of punishment and it is to ban or give no active place to any form of harsh deterrents or corporal punishment.  Instead, the system is given the task to rescue and educate offenders for their successful reintegration into the community...[It] is not a system of punishment or retribution.  It is a system that concentrates on treatment to fully assist offenders in the process of their reintegration into the community.’[6]

Indonesia subscribes to the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (‘UN Standard Minimum Rules’) which provide detailed guidelines in relation to punishment within the prison system:

‘Section 30(2): No prisoner shall be punished unless he has been informed of the offence alleged against him and given a proper opportunity of presenting his defence.  The competent authority shall conduct a thorough examination of the case.’

‘Section 31: Corporal punishment by placing in a dark cell and all cruel, inhuman or degrading punishments shall be completely prohibited as punishments for disciplinary offences.’

A 1990 Asia Watch report on Indonesia assessed Indonesia’s prison system and stated that ‘the Director General of the prison system has formally abolished corporal punishment, handcuffs, and the practice of reducing meals to only rice as disciplinary measures, but in practice, these measures continue…physical abuse is a major method of punishment.’[7]

In his 1992 report, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture concluded that ‘in East Timor torture is said to be practiced rather routinely…’[8]

The UNCHR in 1993[9] encouraged Indonesia to take steps to implement the recommendations presented by the Special Rapporteur on Torture in his report. In 1994, Amnesty International noted that the Indonesian Government’s decision to invite the Special Rapporteur on Torture to visit Indonesia and East Timor in 1992 was a positive initiative but noted that the government had failed to act upon the Special Rapporteur’s recommendations. ‘More important, the failure to act has meant the root causes of torture and ill-treatment, as identified by the Special Rapporteur, have yet to be addressed.[10]

By 1995, there had been no improvement and Amnesty International concluded that while torture and ill-treatment were prohibited under the Indonesian Criminal Code (KUHP), the Code of Criminal Procedure (KUHAP) and by various ministerial regulations, ‘these laws and regulations have not prevented torture and ill-treatment or provided effective avenues for redress. Nor have they been effective in ensuring that the perpetrators are brought promptly to justice.’[11]

Some cases of violations follow:

·      On 1^st April 1995, several prisoners who were singing in their cells were taken away and tortured, supposedly for their singing. The torture lasted three days. When they returned to their cells they were observed to be severely bruised from the beatings they received.

·      On 15^th September 1995, Henrique Belmiro da Costa, who was ill, was taken from his cell and tortured.

·      On 16^th September 1995, Pedro da Costa, who had failed to make his regular report to the prison officers because he was ill, was taken from his cell and tortured. da Costa had been imprisoned for his involvement in the 9^th January 1995 demonstration at UNTIM. 

·      Following the torture of Pedro da Costa, prisoners staged a peaceful protest outside the Security Office of Becora prison. In response, three prisoners were immediately tortured and put in isolation for 24 hours.

·      In December 1995, three more were tortured by members of the special torture unit.

·      On 24^th December 1995, security officers did not allow East Timorese prisoners to attend Christmas and New Year services in the prison chapel. The incident contravened Article 14 (1) (a) of Law No. 12 of 1995 that gives prisoners the right to carry out worship in accordance with their religion or beliefs.

In January 1996, violence erupted as a result of increasing frustration and anger among the East Timorese prisoners and detainees.[12] This had been building up because of systematic torture and ill treatment of East Timorese prisoners, discrimination against them, and poor prison conditions.[13] A second riot occurred in the same month following the torture of Mario Pinto Ximenes Da Costa.  He was tortured for protesting when his relatives were refused permission to visit because they had forgotten to bring their identity cards (known as ‘KTP’ kartu pengenalan). Rioting prisoners broke doors and windows and tried to burn the prison down. 

A further riot took place on 30^th January 1996 following the torture of Alexandrino Da Costa. Da Costa was returning from hospitalization after a previous incident of torture. Aware of the risk to their own lives, prisoners rioted, throwing stones at the buildings and at the prison guards and setting fire to property. The prisoners became irate when the guards opened fire wounding several. The prisoners retreated into the prison blocks. One prisoner died and five seriously wounded in the riot. The survivors were subjected to torture and abused which stopped only after the arrival of Bishop Belo and the ICRC.

Similar incidents occurred throughout 1996 till 1999. Conditions were appalling. Visitors to the jail could see for themselves the types of wounds resulting from the abuses they suffered. In time a full and impartial inquiry must be made into these allegations. While the ICRC called for restraint, evidence mounted throughout the three years to 1999 that little was done to prohibit all forms of torture and ill treatment and to ensure that all such acts were recognized as criminal offences, and punishable by penalties which reflect the seriousness of the crimes.

As evidence these cases need no comment. They encapsulate what people in East Timor suffered for 25 years. Human rights? The international agreements to which Indonesia was a signatory meant nothing.

Human rights

A member of the Commission on Human Rights since 1991, Indonesia has repeatedly affirmed its commitment to international human rights principles.  The Indonesian Criminal Code makes it a crime punishable by up to four years in prison for any official to use violence or force to elicit a confession. In practice, however, legal protection is both inadequate and widely ignored Security forces employed torture and other forms of mistreatment, particularly in regions where there were active security concerns, such as Irian Jaya and East Timor. Being a signatory on a human rights treaty was one thing. Practice was another.

On 6^th June 1997, the spokesman for the secretary-general issued the following statement: ‘The secretary-general has been following with concern the reports of the recent violent incidents in East Timor which have resulted in the loss of life and are causing considerable human suffering. The secretary-general has called on all parties concerned to exercise restraint. It may be recalled that the secretary-general is scheduled to hold meetings with the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia and Portugal on 19 and 20 June in New York on the question of East Timor.’[14]

On 10^th June 1997, United States Congressman Patrick Kennedy introduced an amendment to the Foreign Relations Reform Act, which was unanimously approved by the United States House of Representatives. The amendment expressed the concern of Congress in condemning the human rights abuses committed against the people of the former Portuguese colony of East Timor by the Indonesian Government.[15]

In September 1997, Human Rights Watch issued a report on Indonesia and East Timor [16] in which it made the following points:

·      ‘The (Indonesian election) months of May, June, and July 1997 marked an intensification of the conflict in East Timor, with guerrilla attacks on both Indonesian military targets and civilians and intensive operations by the Indonesian army to find and punish those responsible.

·      Guerrillas targeted polling places (….) to highlight their rejection of Indonesian rule. Some thirty people died in these attacks, including at least ten civilians, whose deaths Human Rights Watch condemned as a clear violation of international law.

·       (…) violations of humanitarian law by the guerrillas, (...) cannot justify violations in return by the Indonesian Government and armed forces: the months following the attacks have been characterized by widespread arbitrary detention, torture, and at least one high-profile death in custody that needs further investigation. (...)

·      Military teams (…) systematically rounded up large numbers of people, detaining them for days or weeks at a time without a warrant or detention order, and intimidating or torturing them so that the army can get information about possible suspects. Hundreds of East Timorese, men and women, were arrested in this manner in June and July 1997, a continuation of a long-established pattern in East Timor.

·      Torture, particularly with electric shocks but also with a variety of instruments such as rattan, metal pipes, and electric cable, (was) a standard method of interrogation used by police and army personnel alike.

·      Torture (was) carried out primarily in police stations and military posts or intelligence safe houses immediately after arrests, but (…) arresting officers (often taking suspects from their homes into forest areas (….) torturing them for information there, where there may be less danger of word filtering back to local human rights monitors or the ICRC.

·      Torture (…) became a source of income for individual officers in East Timor who (sold) photographs and even videotapes of interrogation sessions to the highest bidder, with the price rising as more details (such as where and when the interrogation took place) were included.

The report’s summary was that the human rights situation in East Timor had worsened. Despite some high-profile prosecutions there appeared to have been no progress on the part of the Indonesian military command in curbing torture and arbitrary arrests. This was not to suggest that no arrests were ever justified. The Indonesian Government was, after all, fighting an armed insurgency. But civilians and non-combatants needed protection from human rights violations by the Indonesian army, and instead of taking steps to prevent abuse, Indonesian officers blamed the guerrillas and their supporters.

On 6^th November 1997, five members of the United States Congress addressed a letter to Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, urging the withdrawal of United States support for the IMF aid package to Indonesia unless Indonesia ‘stops its oppressive practices and shows respect for the people of East Timor’.  The Indonesian Government reiterated its position that it considered outside investigations or foreign-based criticism of alleged human rights violations to be interference in its internal affairs.

On January 22^nd 1998, Frank R. Wolf, a Member of the US Congress, following a visit to Dili in December 1997, wrote to President Clinton.

As you are seeking ways to bail out Indonesia from its current economic crisis, largely of its own making, it is important that you actively seek ways to help the end of the reign of terror being waged on people of East Timor. The time is now.

I have heard nothing to indicate that the administration has raised the East Timor issue in its recent discussions with Indonesian officials about the International Monetary Fund package. As you are helping the people of Indonesia, you should also be considering how the East Timorese can benefit from the global bailout. It is not right that they should continue living in fear at the same time millions of American tax dollars are being funneled into the very regime whose military has terrorized them for decades.

It is time to break this cycle. It is critical that the administration use this current opportunity to help end decades of repression and promote autonomy for the East Timorese.

Any economic bailout would, either directly or indirectly, contribute to the financing of the Indonesian army's activities in East Timor. Indonesian security forces raid homes in the middle of the night, take away young people and torture them. The army is brutal and excessive. It answers to no one. It has engaged in a reign of terror on the island that has left the people scared, tense and without hope for protection or justice. We should be urging the military to withdraw from East Timor.

Bishop Belo won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996 bringing the world's attention to this conflict. But it has been over a year since the award and the killings, disappearances and fear continue. There has been no improvement in the lives of the East Timorese. President Soeharto has done nothing to improve the situation or end the terror. Now he seeks assistance from the international community which will stabilize his regime. In exchange, we should demand that he end Indonesia's stranglehold on East Timor. Doing so would remove a major hurdle toward seeking support for this Indonesian assistance.

Before the United States gives millions to Jakarta, please encourage the Indonesian government to move forward toward peace. We should insist on autonomy or independence. If we can't do it now, when? The United States can take the lead and make a difference in this conflict. I hope it will choose to do so.

Hand-written across bottom he wrote: Now is the time to help the people of East Timor. The Adm must act[17].

The US Department of State in its 1997 annual report on human rights released on 30^th January 1998 accused the Government of Indonesia of continuing to commit serious human rights abuses. The report made the following points:

·      Troop levels remained unjustifiably high, totaling over 20,000.

·      No significant progress had been made in accounting for persons missing following the 1991 Dili massacre.

·      The Government was sponsoring bands of paramilitary youths organized and directed by the military to intimidate its opponents.

·      The Government was granting limited access to East Timor for foreign journalists but banning travel by foreign human rights non-governmental organizations except ICRC.

·      Cases were cited of East Timorese mounting intrusions into various embassies in Jakarta, seeking asylum or publicity for their cause.

·      Cases of detainees in East Timor being shot while allegedly attempting to escape were cited.

·      Military units were reportedly regularly detaining civilians for interrogation, and held in extralegal military detention centres, often with no notification of relatives.

·      Numerous reports were cited detailing cases of beatings, torture and rape by military personnel.

In the same month President Bill Clinton asked Congress to approve US $19 billion to boost IMF resources after IMF-led bailouts for Thailand, South Korea and Indonesia. Horta responded by urging the US Congress not to approve any more IMF aid to Indonesia, warning that any move to bail out ‘dictatorships’ would be unacceptable to the international community. In response to the continuing economic crisis in Indonesia, Horta pointed out that it would be an affront for the international community and the poor if the US Congress, which had not approved payment of the US’ debt to the UN, were to approve another $US 18-20 billion for the IMF to rescue a dictatorship in Indonesia.

On February 8^th 1998, another concerned American paid a visit to East Timor. Bishop Talbert was the president of the National Council of Churches in 1996-97. He wrote that:

 ‘since Indonesia's Dec. 7, 1975 invasion of East Timor, more than 200,00 people, about third of the population, have lost their lives.  My awareness of such a mind-numbing statistic, however, did not  prepare me for the pervasive climate of fear and terror that I encountered in my recent trip there.

 I led a 10-member ecumenical delegation of the National Council of Churches to the former Portuguese colony last year. While the Indonesian authorities tried to stage manage every aspect of our trip, they could not hide the brutal reality of Indonesia's presence. We heard numerous accounts during private meetings with East Timorese of ongoing repression, systematic torture, and even extrajudicial execution of people suspected of pro-independence activities.

The awarding of the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize to Bishop Carlos Belo, head of the territory's Catholic Church, and Jose Ramos-Ramos Horta, leader of the diplomatic wing of the resistance, has led to a great increase in international activism in favour of East Timor, including in Congress. But within East Timor, Indonesia has actually intensified its repression.

 As an American, I'm dismayed that the Clinton administration continues to participate in this process of oppression. While the administration has made some overtures to Indonesia aimed at lessening abuses in the territory, they have been totally insufficient, failing to raise a strong protest for the basic human rights of the East Timorese, especially that of self-determination. [18]

A March 1998 report of Amnesty International[19] focused on the implementation of the recommendations contained in the report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions[20] after a visit to the Territory from 3^rd to 13^th July 1994. It stated that, with the exception of the recommendation on the establishment of a human rights commission, the Government of Indonesia had so far not acted on the other recommendations contained in that report. It noted that the Indonesian National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM), which was established by Presidential Decree in 1993, had become an important mechanism for the protection of human rights in East Timor. Its findings resulted in members of the military facing prosecution for violations of human rights. However, Komnas had limited resources and legal powers and the Government often ignored its findings or implemented them only partially. Its operations were subject to intensive military surveillance. Its Dili office had not operated effectively as it conducted few if any investigations into violations of human rights, leaving East Timorese without even this limited mechanism for seeking justice and redress for human rights violations.

The report referred to attacks on military and civilian targets. It also condemned FRETILIN attacks on civilians but stated that investigations on subsequent similar allegations had not been possible because of restrictions on access imposed by the Government. The unwillingness, or the inability of the Government to implement human rights recommendations reflected a general reluctance by the authorities to address the fundamental causes of human rights violations including the impunity enjoyed by the security forces.[21]

On 24^th April 1998, the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights issued a statement on East Timor indicating that the commission:

·      (followed) with deep concern the reports on violations of human rights in East Timor.

·      (recalled) the undertakings by the Government of Indonesia to promote human rights in East Timor… The Commission stresses the need for their implementation, including concrete steps on the early trial and release of East Timorese detained or convicted, and for those in custody to be treated humanely. The Commission reiterates the need for further clarification of the circumstances surrounding the Dili incident of 1991.

·      (welcomed) the efforts of the Indonesian National Commission on Human Rights to promote and protect human rights and undertake fact-finding inquiries into human rights violations, including through its office in Dili.

·      (noted) the commitment by the Government of Indonesia to continue to allow greater access to East Timor by the international media and international humanitarian organizations.

·      (noted) with interest the Government of Indonesia's decision to launch a National Plan of Action on human rights in 1998 and, in that context, the Government's intention to ratify the Convention against Torture.

·      (welcomed) the dialogue under the auspices of the secretary-general for achieving a just, comprehensive and internationally acceptable solution to the question of East Timor… the Commission stresses the need for constructive actions in order to promote a favourable atmosphere for further progress towards a solution.[22]

Despite these pleas the White House continued to deny East Timor delegations’ requests to meet with the President Clinton or any other high-level administration official. Calls for a discontinuation of arms sales, military training and finance for Indonesia's military fell on deaf ears. US diplomatic pressure on Jakarta was less than strong and fell far short of calling for an end to the violence.

If the international community would not act more forcibly, what would change the situation?

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[1] Moniz, Domingus Maria Addressing the UN Commission on Human Rights 54th Session, held in March 1998

[2] In Indonesian times, the Baucau Hotel managed by ABRI

[3] Amaral, Nelson de Jesus Guterres Amaral, cited in ETISC internet postings op cit

[4] There were 257 prisoners as at 30 Jan 1996 (Reuters, Jakarta, 30 January 1996).

[5] The letter was dated 1 April 1996.

[6] Tuned to the Rhythms of Society: The Correctional System of Indonesia , Directorate General of Corrections, Ministry of Justice (1980) pp1,5.

[7] Prison Conditions in Indonesia , An Asia Watch Report, 1990, page 31.

[8] E/CN.4/1992/17/Add.1, paragraph 73.

[9] Resolution 1993/97, paragraph 8.

[10]  Amnesty International, Indonesia & East Timor: Fact  and Fiction, Implementing the Recommendations of the UN Commission on Human Rights , 16 February 1994, page 12.

[11] Amnesty International, Indonesia & East Timor: Political Prisoners and the ‘Rule of Law’ , January 1995, page 11.

[12] ‘prisoners’ being those who have already been tried and sentenced; ‘detainees’ being those who have not yet been tried and charged i.e. are being detained for questioning.  In this document, the term ‘prisoners’ is used to cover both.

[13] Amnesty International has previously published a letter by East Timorese political prisoners Becora prison detailing the poor conditions in the prison, East Timor: Who is to Blame? Statement Before the UN Special Committee on Decolonization , 13 July 1994.

[14] SG/SM/6248, 6 June 1997

[15] United States Department of State, Indonesia Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997, Washington, DC, 30 January 1998

[16] Foreign Minister Ali Alatas ran representing East Timor on the list of the ruling party, Golkar.

[17] Wolf, Frank R Report of a Member of the US Congress, Dili December 1997

[18] Talbert, Bishop Melvin; Private correspondence cited in McDonald op cit  February 8^th 1998

[19] Amnesty International. East Timor: Broken Promises – Implementation of the Recommendations of the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions Following a Visit to Indonesia and East Timor in 1994. ASA 21/24/98, March 1998.

[20] report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions # E/CN.4/1995/ 1/Add.1

[21] Human Rights Watch, Indonesia/East Timor: Deteriorating Human Rights in East Timor, Vol. 9, No. 9 (c), September 1997.

[22] Statement from  Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights on East Timor 24^th April 1998